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A b s t r acT
The increased globalisation over the last 20 years has made effective global economic
governance more important than ever. This period has witnessed the rise of a number
of new international governance actors, such as the Group of Twenty (G-20) and the
Financial Stability Board. The paper proposes a five-part test to evaluate how the existing
global governance actors serve the interests of all stakeholders in the global economy.
The test is based on five factors indicating good global governance. These are the goals
relating to global economic governance being followed by the governance entity, respect
for applicable international legal principles, good administrative practice, comprehensive
coverage of all relevant issues and all affected stakeholders, and co-ordinated
specialization. The paper uses these five factors to develop a framework for assessing
the responsiveness of the G-20 to African issues and concerns. The final part of the paper
applies this framework to the documentary outputs of the seven G-20 summits held during
2008–12 to assess their responsiveness to Africa. It looks at how the communiqués and
other key documents from each of the summits address the issues arising from each part of
the test and then makes an assessment of how well the G-20 has satisfied that part of the
test over the course of the period from 2008–12. The paper concludes that the G-20 is not
fully satisfying any of the five parts of the test, and therefore fails to reach its full potential as
a global economic governance actor.

A BOUT THE A UTHOR
Daniel Bradlow is Professor of Law at the American University Washington College of
Law; Extraordinary Professor at the University of Pretoria; and former co-co-ordinator of
the Global Economic Governance Africa project, a joint project of the Centre for Human
Rights, at the University of Pretoria and the South African Institute for International Affairs.
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A b b r e v ia t i o ns and A c r o nyms
AfDB
BIS
CAADP
ECOWAS
FAO
FSB
FSF
G-7
G-20
IFI
ILO
IMF
IOSCO
LDC
MDB
MDG
NEPAD
OECD
OPEC
UDHR
UNCTAD
UNDP
WFP
WTO

African Development Bank
Bank for International Settlements
Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme
Economic Community of West African States
Food and Agriculture Organization
Financial Stability Board
Financial Stability Forum
Group of Seven
Group of Twenty
international financial institution
International Labour Organization
International Monetary Fund
International Organization of Securities Commissions
least-developed country
multilateral development bank
Millennium Development Goal
New Partnership for Africa’s Development
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN Conference on Trade and Development
UN Development Programme
World Food Programme
World Trade Organization
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I N TRO D U C T I O N

G

lobal economic governance has become more complex over the past 20 years. The
range of issues that require global co-ordination now include topics that were once
viewed as falling exclusively within a state’s domestic jurisdiction, like banking regulation,
inclusive green growth, youth employment, and domestic resource mobilisation. There
are also new global governance actors such as the Group of Twenty (G-20), which has
designated itself as the ‘premier’ institution in global economic governance.1 As a result,
global economic governance directly affects a broad range of state and non-state actors,
many of which were previously only indirectly affected by these matters.
Unfortunately, most of these stakeholders are not able to participate effectively in
global economic governance decision making. In some cases, for example the G-20,
this is because membership is restricted to a relatively small number of states. In other
cases, for example the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)2
or the International Monetary Fund (IMF),3 it is because, although membership is more
universal, effective participation in decision making is de facto limited to a smaller number
of actors.
The combination of the expanding scope of global economic governance affairs and
the relative nature of effective participation in the institutional arrangements for global
economic governance creates a challenge for African countries. Currently South Africa
is the only African country that is a member of the G-20 and thus participates in all
G-20 meetings and is eligible to participate in all G-20 working groups. This means that
although South Africa is not formally the designated representative of Africa in the G-20,
it is expected to pay attention to the concerns and interests of the rest of the continent
in regard to the G-20. This places South Africa in an unusual position in the G-20 and
increases the challenges that it faces as the only African member in the G-20. It should
be noted that usually there are other African participants at G-20 summits and at some of
the other G-20 meetings. To date the chair of most recent G-20 summits has invited the
leaders of the countries that chair the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (NEPAD) for that year to participate in the summit.
The limited number of assured African participants in the G-20 increases the risk of
the G-20 paying insufficient attention to issues of concern to Africa or to the potential
adverse impacts of their decisions and actions on Africa. This suggests that it is in the
interests of all African stakeholders in global economic governance to identify means
for enhancing the responsiveness of the key decision makers to non-participants in their
deliberations. One way to do this is to critically assess how well these decision makers are
serving the interests of African stakeholders in the global economy.
This paper proposes a five-part test for making such an assessment. It includes
consideration of such matters as the strategic objective of global economic governance, its
compliance with applicable international legal principles and good administrative practice,
the scope of its coverage of the relevant issues and stakeholders, and the coherence of its
institutional relations.
The paper is divided into three sections. The first section is a description of the G-20.
The second is a discussion of the elements of the assessment framework. The third section
is an application of the proposed assessment framework to the outputs of the G-20, from
an African perspective.
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THE G - 2 04
In 1999, in the wake of the Asian financial crisis in 1997–98, the leading members in the
Group of Seven (G-7) invited the ministers of finance from a select group of countries,
including the G-7 countries, and the EU, to meet. This resulted in the formation of the
G-20 Ministers of Finance in September 1999.5 In 2008, as part of the response to that
year’s global financial crisis, the G-20 was elevated to the level of a summit of heads
of government. The next year, at the Pittsburgh G-20 summit, the participating states
declared that the G-20 was the ‘premier forum’ for global economic governance.6 This
announcement, although its practical implications are not yet clear, amounted to a public
acknowledgment that the G-7 was no longer capable of managing the global economy
on its own and needed to share this responsibility with a broader group of countries.
However, it is important to note that the G-7 still continues to meet and to play a role in
the governance of the global economy.
The G-20 refers to more than a grouping of countries. It is also a short-hand reference
to a complex cluster of governance activities. The apex of this cluster is the annual
summit of the leaders of the G-20, which is the culminating event of an annual work
programme consisting of two work streams. The first, which is guided by ministers of
finance and central bank governors, deals with a range of financial and economic issues.7
These officials meet regularly to discuss global economic conditions and to co-ordinate
their responses to these conditions. They are supported by working groups, each
consisting of and co-chaired by officials from G-20 states. The working groups deal with
such issues as developing the framework for strong sustainable and balanced growth,
financial regulation, financial inclusion, the international financial architecture, energy
and commodities markets, energy and growth, disaster management, and climate finance.
The working groups, in addition to their specific mandates, follow up on the decisions and
requests of the G-20 leaders, promote co-operation between the participants in the G-20
process on particular issues, and help shape the summit discussions and communiqués.
The second track is the Sherpa track.8 This track, in which each leader is represented
by an official, known as the leader’s ‘sherpa’, is responsible for the political aspects of
the G-20’s work. Its workload is undertaken by working groups and it is supplemented,
in some cases, by meetings of ministers other than ministers of finance. Currently there
are working groups for such issues as employment, agriculture and food security, energy,
corruption, and development.
These activities suggest that the G-20 plays three critical global economic governance
roles. First, it is a crisis manager. In this capacity it has forged agreement on the actions
that the participants, individually and collectively, must take in order to try and resolve
the current financial crisis.
Second, the G-20 is the orchestrator of global economic governance. It is the setting
in which the major economies meet with the leading international institutions – the IMF,
the World Bank Group (‘The World Bank’), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the
UN – to discuss the key economic challenges facing the international community and
co-ordinate their responses to these challenges. The G-20, therefore, enables the relevant
policymakers and technical experts from the participating countries and international
organisations to meet and seek common understandings and approaches on particular
issues of global importance.
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Third, the G-20 is a communicator. It helps to promote international global awareness
of the challenges facing the global community and the approach that the most powerful
countries are considering for dealing with these challenges.
There are three aspects of the G-20 structure that should be noted. First, the number
of G-20 participants, in fact, exceeds 20. They usually include a number of additional
states that are invited by the G-20 chair, which is the host state for that year’s summit.
Some of these states, such as Spain, are invited regularly in their own right and some
are invited because of their position as chair of an important regional body, such as the
African Union or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. In addition, the regular
participants include international organisations like the IMF, the World Bank, the regional
development banks, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the Financial Stability
Board (FSB), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the Organisation of Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD), the UN Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the WTO. These organisations
can participate in both the summits and those other G-20 meetings that are most relevant
to their work. Since the G-20 does not have a permanent secretariat, the participating
international organisations usually assume responsibility for preparing the background
studies and policy proposals requested by the leaders of the G-20. For example, the
FSB and the IMF co-ordinate studies on financial regulatory issues. In addition, these
organisations can be expected to work with their non-G-20 member states to implement
applicable recommendations of the G-20. It is not clear what role, if any, they may play in
informing the G-20 about the views of their non-G-20 member states.
Second, the G-20 has begun a process of outreach to other stakeholders in the global
economy. This process, which is managed by the chair of the G-20, usually includes
meetings of business leaders and labour leaders from the G-20 countries, and separate
meetings of representatives of think tanks, civil society, and youth groups from these
countries. These meetings, which may lead to reports that feed into the G-20 process, are
an opportunity for the G-20 to learn the views of other stakeholders.
Third, the G-20 has initiated a peer-review process, called the Mutual Assessment
Process, that is designed to ensure that the economic and financial policies of the G-20
are co-ordinated and compatible. In this process, each of the states is expected to report
on its macroeconomic policies and to have them reviewed by its peers in the G-20. The
process is managed by the IMF.
Given its important role in global economic governance, it is striking that the G-20
remains an informal grouping of states and international organisations. It is not based on
a treaty and has no formal international legal personality. In addition, it has no permanent
headquarters or secretariat. As a result, the reports, communiqués, and documents that
it issues have no formal international legal status. Thus when the G-20 states make firm
commitments in the communiqués and other G-20 documents, they do not constitute
obligations for which states can be held legally responsible if they fail to comply with their
obligations.
This does not, however, mean that non-compliance has no consequences for either
the G-20 states or for other stakeholders. First, in some cases, a G-20 country’s failures to
comply with the G-20’s decisions can adversely affect its credibility, its relations with other
G-20 states, and its access to financing. In addition, G-20 decisions can have, and in some
cases are intended to have, an impact beyond the participants in the G-20. For example,
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non-G-20 states that fail to comply with G-20 financial regulatory and transparency
requirements can suffer adverse consequences in terms of their borrowing costs, the
attractiveness of the country to foreign investors, and their relations with the states
and international organisations that participate in the G-20.9 Non-state actors in these
countries’, for example, financial institutions, can suffer analogous adverse consequences.
Thus for these states, and the non-state actors in these states, the decisions and actions of
global economic governance de facto have a compliance pull that is stronger than for the
richer and more powerful states.
This differential impact on the various stakeholders in the global economy is
exacerbated by the legal status of the current arrangements. It makes it difficult for
adversely affected stakeholders to hold a key actor like the G-20 accountable for its
decisions and actions. This situation of power without accountability is troubling and
requires a response. One possible response is a framework for assessing the outputs of
global economic governance decision making.

A F R A M E W OR K F OR A S S E S S I N G G L OB A L E C O N O M I C
GOVER N A N C E
The framework proposed in this section consists of five factors, each of which is discussed
below.
Factor 1: What is the goal?
The first challenge for any governance system is to define its ultimate objective. All state
and non-state stakeholders agree that every society should aim to offer all its members
lives of dignity and opportunity. Although these stakeholders may differ in how they
understand and plan to reach this objective, they all acknowledge that it includes
economic, social, political, environmental, and cultural aspects. Moreover, they all agree
that this goal, which none of them has fully achieved, has both an individual and a social
dimension. This means that the ultimate objective of global economic governance should
be to achieve ‘development’ as defined in the Declaration on the Right to Development:10
[D]evelopment is a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process, which
aims at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all
individuals on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in development
and in the fair distribution of benefits resulting therefrom.

This definition suggests two considerations that can be used in a global economic
governance assessment framework. The first is the extent to which the actors in
global economic governance promote economic policies and practices that enable all
stakeholders, including the weakest societies and the poorest individuals, to share in the
benefits of the global economic system. The second is that global economic governance
must promote economic policies that are sustainable, so that they will not be undermined
over time by their environmental or social costs.

S A I I A O C C A S I O N A L P A P E R N U M B E R 14 5

8

THE G-20 AND AFRICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT

From an African perspective, these two considerations suggest that the core global
economic governance issue regarding this factor is inclusion at the global, national, and
local levels. This issue has a number of dimensions. The first is the economic effects of
the lack of inclusiveness – that is poverty, inequality, and unemployment. The second is
the issue of social exclusion, which includes such considerations as discrimination, the
lack of access to education, justice, and social services. Third is the political dimension
of inclusiveness at the national level, which refers to the ability of citizens to engage in
national affairs. The fourth aspect of inclusiveness is manifested at the global level and is
concerned with the way in which the global economic governance arrangements facilitate
or undermine transparency, participation by all stakeholders, and accountability.
It is important to note that in order for the G-20 to be viewed as performing acceptably
on this factor, it is not necessary that the G-20 itself deal directly with a particular issue.
It is sufficient for the G-20 to show that it has taken the various dimensions of this factor
into account and ensured that it is addressed somewhere in the existing arrangements for
global economic governance.
Factor 2: Respect for the applicable international law11
As indicated above, some significant global economic governance actors are not subjects
of international law. Nevertheless, there are a limited number of international legal
principles, derived from customary international law and general principles of law, that are
relevant for all actors in global economic governance.12 This means that these have been
incorporated into state practice, including in their dealings with other states and global
actors, because the states believe they have an obligation to comply with the requirements
of these principles.13 These principles are:
Sovereignty
The customary international law principle of respect for state sovereignty means that
global economic governance actors should refrain from interfering in those matters that fall
within the domestic jurisdiction of each sovereign state.14 This obligation is becoming both
easier and more complex. On the one hand, the scope of matters that are deemed by the
UN to fall within a sovereign state’s domestic jurisdiction has narrowed over time, so that
currently, for example, states are required to report to international supervisory bodies15 on
their compliance with the specific international human rights agreements to which they are
party.16 On the other hand, the resulting expansion in the powers and responsibilities of the
actors in the international sphere imposes an obligation on them to deal responsibly with
issues that were previously viewed as being within a state’s exclusive jurisdiction and in
which their actions can have a direct impact on a range of state and non-state stakeholders.
The legal principle of state sovereignty is an important criterion in assessing global
governance because, at a minimum, it reminds global economic governance decision
makers that they should act in ways that preserve as much independence and policy space
for states as is consistent with effective global economic governance.  
Non-discrimination17
The principle of non-discrimination requires subjects of international law to treat all
similarly situated parties in a like manner. However, the impact of the decisions and
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actions of global economic governance will affect different states differently depending on
their wealth, power, and position in the global economy. This suggests that the application
of the principle of non-discrimination to global economic governance requires treating all
similarly situated states similarly and all dissimilarly situated states differently. This allows
for the possibility of giving special treatment to weak and poor states to compensate for
their relative lack of access to and participation in the institutions of global economic
governance.
Treatment of legal persons
The principle of non-discrimination has relevance to the responsibility of the actors in
global economic governance to corporate actors in the global economy.18 They would be
eligible for non-discriminatory treatment when they operate outside their home state. This
would include ensuring that they receive at least national treatment in their dealings with
their host states.19
Treatment of natural persons
For many international legal scholars and diplomats, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR)20 has assumed the status of an instrument of customary international
law.21 Thus the UDHR helps to identity and define the responsibilities of global economic
governance actors to natural persons. The challenge for global economic governance is
that the UDHR only contains general principles, as it was always envisaged that they
would be elaborated and eventually made binding through treaties.22 This means that
the UDHR does not provide clear operational guidance to global economic governance
decision makers. At most it suggests that these decision makers have an obligation to
respect, protect and fulfill those human rights principles expressed in the UDHR. Exactly
how each decision maker should fulfill these obligations is not clear and thus, in effect,
the decision is left to the discretion of each actor.
Environmental responsibility
In regard to customary international environmental law, the most relevant obligation
is to undertake impact assessments.23 Given the importance of sustainability to global
economic governance, this principle is clearly relevant to the conduct of each actor within
the realm of global economic governance. However, the principle is stated too generally
to provide clear guidance on how it should be applied in this context. Therefore, global
economic actors retain considerable discretion in deciding how to apply the principle in
their activities.
Principle of good faith24
In this context, the principle of good faith can be interpreted as a call for honesty and
fairness in dealings between the various actors and stakeholders in global economic
governance. However, the principle offers little guidance to actors seeking to implement
it in their global governance activities. For example, the principle does not help a decision
maker know whether or when to consult with each of the stakeholders in a particular
matter of global economic governance, how much information to make available to the
stakeholders, or how to handle complaints from the different stakeholders in the matter.
In fact, it is possible that honest and fair dealing in a particular international economic

S A I I A O C C A S I O N A L P A P E R N U M B E R 14 5

10

THE G-20 AND AFRICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT

governance matter may require different answers for different stakeholders, depending
on their interest in the particular matter and, in some cases, the identity of the particular
decision maker. Given these variables, the content of this obligation must be left to the
discretion of each actor.
The fact that the applicable international legal principles are stated in general terms
that are not easily applied to global economic governance would seem to suggest that
they cannot be very useful in assessing the performance of the key actors in global
economic governance. However, this is not accurate. Although the principles allow each
actor considerable discretion in their implementation, they do establish a floor for the
conduct of global economic governance. Thus global economic governance decisions and
actions that fail to demonstrate some attention to these principles would be considered
to be unacceptable, in the sense of being non-compliant with the applicable minimum
standards.
Factor 3: Good administrative practice25
The general principles of administrative law and practice that are recognised by all
nations are relevant because global economic governance, to a significant extent,
involves designing rules for regulating the global economy. In this sense, the actors in
global economic governance are comparable to administrative agencies in domestic
law. This suggests that they should comply with the principles of good administrative
practice that are applicable to any national-level administrative agency. These principles
are transparency, predictability, participation, reasoned and timely decision making, and
accountability.
Factor 4: Comprehensive coverage
Comprehensive coverage refers to the need for all the mechanisms and institutions
of global economic governance to be applicable to and serve all the interests of all
stakeholders in the international economic system. This means, for example, in the case
of international financial governance, that the mechanisms of international financial
governance must address such diverse matters as all the regulatory, supervisory, resource
allocation, and developmental needs of states, international organisations, financial
intermediaries that engage in sophisticated national and cross-border financial transactions
and their clients, savers and investors who wish to base their financial transactions on
religious principles, small financial institutions that operate only in local markets, microfinancial institutions, and small businesses, community groups, and individuals that
have difficulty accessing financial services. In addition, the actors in global economic
governance must be flexible and dynamic enough to adapt to the changing needs and
activities of all these stakeholders.
One corollary of the principle of comprehensive coverage is that the principle of
subsidiarity26 should apply to global economic governance. This principle holds that all
decisions should be taken at the lowest level in the system compatible with effective
decision making. It is a complicated principle to implement because it must apply both
in standard operating conditions and in crisis situations, when decisions may need to
be made at a different level than during normal conditions. In addition, it may require a
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conflict resolution mechanism that is capable of resolving disputes over which level is the
most appropriate for resolving a particular issue.
This factor is particularly relevant to Africa because both African state and nonstate actors have particular needs that may not always be addressed by the key actors
in global economic governance. For example, it has some needs relating to access to
both domestic and international financial services, to water and food security, and in
regard to international trade, that are different from the concerns of the richest and most
powerful states in the global system. In addition, Africa has a rich network of regional and
subregional groupings that can play a role in global economic governance. The principle
of subsidiarity is particularly relevant to efforts to incorporate these institutions into the
overall scheme for global economic governance.
Factor 5: Co-ordinated specialisation
Co-ordinated specialisation acknowledges that even though all aspects of global economic
governance are interconnected, global economic governance cannot function efficiently
without institutions that have limited and specialised mandates.27 The principle of
co-ordinated specialisation is intended to ensure that the actors in global economic
governance act in mutually consistent and supportive ways to meet all the needs of all
stakeholders in global economic governance. It has two requirements. First, the mandate
of the mechanisms and institutions of global economic governance must be clearly defined
and must be limited to their areas of specialisation. Second, in executing their specialised
responsibilities these institutions cannot ignore the impact they have on and the ways in
which they are affected by other actors in global governance. Consequently, there is a need
for co-ordination between the institutions and mechanisms of international economic
governance themselves and with the key actors in other areas of global governance. The
co-ordinating mechanism’s function is to resolve tensions between the different actors in
global economic governance and between them and other actors in global governance. It is
also to facilitate coherence in global economic governance. It is important to note that the
G-20 has assumed for itself the role as the co-ordinating mechanism in global economic
governance by calling itself the ‘premier forum’ in this regard.

A F R A M E W OR K F OR EV A L U A T I N G THE G - 2 0 ’ s
RE S P O N S I VE N E S S TO A F R I C A N I N TERE S T S A N D C O N C ER N S
Based on the above factors it is possible to develop the following tests for assessing the
performance of the G-20 in regard to Africa in general.
Factor 1: What is the goal?
1 How well does the G-20 address the challenges of poverty, inequality, and unemployment
in Africa?
2 How well does the G-20 address the problems of education, the lack of access to justice
and social services in Africa?28
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3 How well does the G-20 address the challenge of ensuring that Africans have the ability
to participate in national political affairs?
Factor 2: Respect for the applicable international law
1 Is the G-20 respectful of African sovereignty?
2 Does the G-20 comply with the principle of non-discrimination?
3 How effectively does the G-20 respond to the difficult environmental challenges that
Africa is facing?
Factor 3: Good administrative practice
1 Does the G-20 operate in ways that comply with the principles of good administrative
practice, namely transparency, predictability, participation, reasoned and timely
decision making, and accountability?
Factor 4: Comprehensive coverage
1 Does the G-20 respond to all the needs of all African stakeholders in global economic
governance?
2 Does the G-20 make efforts to incorporate African regional and subregional bodies in
its deliberations and in the operation of global economic governance?
Factor 5: Co-ordinated specialisation
1 Does the G-20 have a means for ensuring that all the institutions and arrangements
for global economic governance offer African states a coherent framework for global
economic governance?
2 Are there mechanisms in place to resolve conflicts and contradictions in the decisions,
actions and operations of all the regional and global actors in global economic
governance?

A P P L Y I N G THE F R A M E W OR K TO THE G - 2 0 S U M M I T S
The purpose of this section is to apply the above frameworks to the official outputs of the
seven G-20 summits that have taken place to date. The format of the section will be to
discuss briefly how each of the seven summits addressed each of the five factors identified
above.
Factor 1: What is the goal?
Washington DC, November 2008
The primary goal of this summit was crisis management. Nevertheless, the G-20 leaders,
in their statement, did pay some attention to longer-term considerations. They expressed
their interest in laying the foundation for a fair and sustainable global economy. They
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proposed that families should be at the heart of recovery plans in all states, regardless
of their level of wealth. They also expressed an intention to deal with the problems of
poverty, disease, rule of law, and climate change.
These statements suggest that at least at a rhetorical level the G-20 leaders were paying
attention to the issues of concern to Africa. However, it is important to note that the G-20
leader’s statements do not contain any explicit references to Africa.
London, April 2009
The primary focus of this summit was also on crisis management, however, the participants
intimated that their longer-term objective is a more inclusive economic system. For
example, the leaders stated that they agreed on the desirability of a new global consensus
on values and principles to promote sustainable economic recovery and to restore world
economic growth on a fair, green, and sustainable basis. They also acknowledged that they
had a responsibility to mitigate the social impact of the crisis, and to this end pledged $50
billion for crisis support for low-income countries. The pledged funds would be used for
social protection, and to boost trade and restore development, including food security.
The communiqué also indicated that the G-20 would protect their development assistance
budgets and efforts to reach the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
The statement from the leaders in London indicates that they were not unaware of
the concerns and interests of low-income countries in general and were interested in
mitigating the impact of the crisis on these countries. This suggests that the G-20 at this
time had an implicit goal of promoting a more inclusive global economic system.
Pittsburgh, September 2009
Although again the primary focus of this summit also was on crisis management, the
G-20 leaders stated that their goal was to launch a framework for ‘strong, sustainable and
balanced growth’ and to reform the global architecture and regulatory arrangements to
support this framework. The leaders did not define the elements of this framework, but
they did express an intention to take steps to increase access to food, fuel, and finance
among the world’s poorest. This suggests that the G-20 continued to have an implicit goal
of promoting a more inclusive global economic system.
Toronto, June 2010
Although the official documents issued at the Toronto summit do not make any new
statements relating to the goal of the G-20, they do demonstrate support for inclusion. For
example, the leaders confirmed that they are committed to narrowing the development
gap and that this involves taking the impact of their policy actions on low-income
countries into account in their policymaking. In this regard, the leaders acknowledged
the importance of working with the least-developed countries (LDCs) to make them active
participants in and beneficiaries of the global economic system.
Seoul, November 2010
This summit is the first in which the G-20 paid significant explicit attention to the issue
of development, which required them to pay more attention to the implications for the
overall goal of inclusion. For example, in their communiqué, the leaders expressed an
intention to make sure that the perspectives of the emerging markets were better reflected
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in the financial regulatory reform efforts that were then under way. In addition, both
in their communiqué and in the leaders’ declaration, they recognised the importance of
addressing the concerns of the most vulnerable by providing social protection and by
placing the creation of jobs and decent work at the heart of the recovery. This summit also
gave birth to the Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth, in which the leaders
stated that they would work in partnership with developing countries and low-income
countries to help them build capacity to maximise their growth and development potential
and to make a significant difference in people’s lives.
The statements in their communiqué suggest that the G-20 leaders were concerned
about the issue of inclusion both at a global governance level and at a national level.
Cannes, November 2011
In their communiqué, the G-20 leaders specifically committed themselves to inclusive
and resilient growth, although they did not provide a clear definition for this concept.
Nevertheless, the report of the G-20 development working group states that the
participants would facilitate and would work together to eradicate poverty in their
development co-operation work. They also expressed a strong commitment to promote
African regional integration. Finally, in their Action Plan on Growth and Jobs, the leaders
stated that their ultimate goal is to provide more and better jobs for their citizens, to
promote social inclusion in all countries, and to foster development and poverty reduction
in less-developed countries.
This summit was the first to specifically address some of the issues that arise from the
G-20’s implicit goal of inclusion, albeit in the G-20’s Development Working Group report
rather than in the leaders’ communiqué. The statements addressing these issues remain
relatively general and are not linked to any specific actions. Nevertheless, they are helpful
to African countries in giving some guidance on the ultimate goals of the G-20 and thus
some basis on which to assess future G-20 statements and actions.
Los Cabos, June 2012
Although the G-20 leaders did not make any statements about their goals for the G-20
in their communiqué, they did discuss issues related to the implicit goal of inclusion
in the G-20 Labour and Employment Ministers’ Conclusions and in the report of the
G-20 Development Working Group. The first of these two documents expresses the
G-20’s concern about employment, social protection, social dialogue and full respect for
the fundamental principles and rights at work. The report of the Development Working
Group explicitly acknowledges the need to promote inclusive green growth that takes into
account the results of the Rio+20 meeting and of other relevant forums.
This summit document suggests two things. First, that the G-20 is beginning to
articulate a vision of what its implicit goal of inclusion means. The outputs of the summit
indicate that, at least for the participants in this summit, ‘inclusion’ incorporates decent
work and attention to environmental sustainability. It is also important to note in this
regard that the goal is being articulated at a general and rather abstract level. Second,
however, it also suggests that the leaders are delegating responsibility for articulating
this vision to their ministers and representatives in the subcommittees of the G-20. This
suggests that the G-20 leaders may not endorse the views of inclusion expressed in other
parts of the G-20 process. This, in turn, has uncertain implications for whether African
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countries can rely on the goal being articulated by the G-20. These two considerations
pose substantial challenges in regard to holding the G-20 states to account for the way in
which they seek to implement this vision.
Assessment
As the acute phase of the financial crisis passed, the G-20 leaders were able to begin
paying attention to the reforms needed to avoid future crises and to what the goals of
building a post-recovery economic system should be. In this regard, the G-20 leaders
have begun, at least implicitly, to articulate a goal for global economic governance. This
goal, based on the official outputs of the seven summits, is to build a more inclusive
and sustainable global economy. Although they have not provided much detail on their
understanding of this goal, they have provided some. They have said that it incorporates
decent work, social protection, social dialogue, environmental concerns, and efforts to
eradicate poverty. Although it would be desirable to have more detail on this vision, the
goal being developed for the G-20, at this stage, seems compatible with the concerns and
interests of African countries. However, the goal is still at too general a level to be useful
as a basis for assessing the efforts of the G-20 to attain the goal and for holding the G-20
leaders to account for the way in which they have worked to reach this goal.
Factor 2: Respect for the applicable international law
As discussed, there are only a few international legal principles that are applicable to global
economic governance, and therefore to the work of the G-20. These are the principles
of respect for national sovereignty, the principle of non-discrimination, the principle of
environmental responsibility, and the principle of good faith. Although the G-20 official
documents do not explicitly discuss the application of international law to the G-20, there
are a number of statements in the official documents from each of the summits that are
relevant to this issue.
Washington DC, November 2008
In the Washington DC summit communiqué, the leaders indicated their respect for
national sovereignty. They stressed the importance of country ownership of national
economic policy and of promoting co-operation between countries within a framework of
agreed rules and regulations.
The leaders’ expression of respect for national sovereignty in the midst of an economic
crisis that had spilled over national borders and was affecting the whole world in part
through global financial markets was significant. It suggested that the leaders were
interested in protecting the policy space for all countries, including African countries.
London, April 2009
The London summit documents contain only two references to applicable international
legal principles. The first is that the communiqué seeks to convey respect for the principle
of good faith. The communiqué’s references to the leaders’ determination to meet their
development assistance commitments, including those made to Africa at the Gleneagles
G-7 summit, are noteworthy demonstrations of respect for the principle of good faith. The
same is true of their statement that the G-20 states would continue their efforts to ensure
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that the international community achieved the MDGs. These references were particularly
pertinent at the time because there was a concern, particularly in Africa, that the G-7
countries would use the crisis as an excuse to avoid their international development
co-operation commitments. Nevertheless, a certain degree of caution about the extent of
the G-20’s determination was warranted because the leaders’ statements were not linked
to any timetables or to any concrete actions.
The second reference is that the communiqué shows some attention to the principle of
non-discrimination by recognising that the G-20 states have some responsibility to mitigate
the social impacts of the crisis. This addresses the requirement that the principle of nondiscrimination pay particular attention to the differential impact that the crisis can have on
differently situated international actors, including poor states and poor people.
Pittsburgh, September 2009
The Pittsburgh summit documents contain two indications of respect for applicable
international law. First, they demonstrate respect for national sovereignty by stipulating
that the responsibility for implementing global financial regulatory standards rests with
the national regulatory authorities. Second, they show respect for the principle of good
faith in their discussion of international trade. In this regard, the G-20 leaders commit
themselves and their countries to reject protectionism in their trade relations, thereby
indicating their intention to live up to the commitments they have made in the agreements
negotiated under the auspices of the WTO.
Toronto, June 2010
The Toronto summit contains only two references to international legal principles. First, it
indicates respect for the principle of good faith when it calls on the G-20 states to sign and
ratify and comply with the applicable anti-corruption treaties. Second, the G-20 leaders
paid attention to the principle of environmental responsibility by calling on members to
participate in and bring to a successful conclusion the climate change negotiations and in
doing so to respect the principle of special and differential responsibilities. Both of these
references have obvious relevance to African countries.
Seoul, November 2010
At the Seoul summit, the leaders paid attention to two applicable international legal
principles. First, they showed their concern for national sovereignty when they stressed
that development co-operation must be a partnership that allows for national ownership of
development-related policies, particularly in the recipient countries. Second, they showed
their respect for the principle of non-discrimination when they suggested they would
pay particular attention to the needs of the weak and vulnerable. In this connection, they
specifically acknowledged an obligation to mitigate the social impact of the crisis and to
ensure that the global economy offered social protection for the weak and vulnerable.
They also suggested that there was an obligation to provide decent work.
Cannes, November 2011
The Cannes summit, while only dealing with two applicable international legal principles,
is the first to contain specific references to international legal documents. The G-20
leaders, again, showed their concern with national sovereignty by stating that the
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responsibilities of the various G-20 countries in designing and implementing international
economic rebalancing policies must take into account national circumstances. The leaders
also demonstrated a concern for the principle of non-discrimination and its requirement to
treat differently situated actors differently. In particular, they reiterated their commitment
to providing social protection and decent work, thereby recognising the need to give
special attention to the weak and the vulnerable. However, this time they added that they
would encourage the ILO to promote the ratification and implementation of the eight ILO
Conventions that together seek to ensure compliance with the fundamental principles
applicable to workers and the right to work.
Los Cabos, June 2012
The Los Cabos summit contains the most references to international law. It demonstrates
the G-20 leaders’ commitment to the principle of non-discrimination by emphasising
the relevance of fighting discrimination and of respecting labour rights to economic
development and the global economy. In this regard, the leaders called on all states
to show full respect for the fundamental principles and rights of workers spelled out
in the 1999 ILO Declaration and in the core labour conventions. The leaders showed
their commitment to environmental responsibility by recognising the importance of
environmental safeguards to sustainable infrastructure projects. They also stressed the
importance of promoting inclusive green growth that is based on the principles of the
Rio+20 meeting.
Assessment
It is clear that the few applicable international legal principles have only played a limited,
and largely implicit, role in the work of the G-20. The most prominent principle has
been respect for national sovereignty. This is important for Africa because it helps African
countries preserve some policy space that can be used to promote policies that are suitable
for specific country conditions.
The principle of non-discrimination has also played a role in G-20 thinking, particularly
as it relates to treating differently situated parties differently. This has manifested itself
in part through the G-20’s statements on financial inclusion, food security and on the
importance of providing protection for poor and vulnerable states and people. Once again,
this is relevant for the many African countries that are part of the group of low-income
countries and to the poor citizens of all African countries. It is also a salutary reminder to
all governments, including African governments, of the importance of taking the social
impacts of their policies into account in their national and international policymaking.
The principle has also manifested itself in regard to the call to G-20 states to promote
decent work and to show full respect for the rights at work as set out in the 1990 ILO
Declaration and in the core ILO worker rights conventions. This issue is of relevance to
South Africa, which has adopted some of the ILO conventions 29 and in which there is a
lively debate about the meaning of decent work. It also has relevance to African countries
that, like South Africa, are dealing with the challenge of unemployment.
Third, the G-20 has paid some attention to the principle of good faith. The G-20’s
attention to good faith has also been applied to the question of compliance with
international treaty obligations relating to corruption, protectionism in international
trade, labour rights, and environmental protection. It should be noted that although
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the empirical record might suggest less than full respect for this principle, the leaders’
statements appear to have two salutary effects. It does appear to constrain their ability
to evade their freely assumed obligations. For example, although many if not all of the
G-20 countries adopted protectionist measures in the wake of the financial crisis, to a
substantial degree they made an effort to adopt measures that were consistent with the
provisions of the various WTO agreements to which they are all signatories. In addition,
the leaders’ statements provide a basis on which other stakeholders can seek to hold them
to account should they fail to comply with their statements.
Finally, the G-20 has paid some attention to the environmental principle of impact
assessments. This is manifested in the Los Cabos summit’s focus on environmental
safeguards in the context of infrastructure development. This is particularly relevant
to African countries, including South Africa, both because of their urgent need for
infrastructure and their vulnerability to climate change and other environmental challenges.
Factor 3: Good administrative practice
The focus in this factor is on assessing the extent to which the G-20, both in its own affairs
and in its interactions with the other international institutional actors in global economic
governance, promotes the principles of transparency, predictability, participation, reasoned
and timely decision making, and accountability.
Washington DC, November 2008
The G-20 made a clear effort to promote participation in the international financial
institutions (IFIs) like the IMF at this summit. The participating states committed
themselves to supporting quota and voice reforms at the IMF. The expectation at the
time was that this would lead to higher quotas for the leading emerging markets, and
an additional African seat on the Board of Executive Directors of the IMF. The G-20
also sought to increase participation by promoting greater involvement of the Board of
Governors in providing strategic guidance to the IMF. There was also some expectation
that these reforms would promote greater accountability of the IMF staff and management
to its member states. Finally, in regard to participation, the G-20 decided to expand the
membership in the Financial Stability Forum (FSF).
The only other aspect of good administrative practice addressed at this summit was
transparency. The G-20 sought to promote transparency at the World Bank and the IMF
by committing to more open, transparent, and merit-based processes for the selection of
the heads and senior management of these organisations.
London, April 2009
The G-20 leaders reiterated their interest in promoting participation in global economic
governance. They called for greater voice and representation for low-income and
emerging economies in the IMF and the World Bank. They promised that they would
implement these reforms at the World Bank by Spring 2010. They also repeated their calls
for expanding membership in the FSB, the successor to the FSF. The leaders confirmed
their support for selecting the heads and senior management of the IFIs through open,
transparent, and merit-based processes. Finally, they repeated their intention to enhance
the role of the Board of Governors of the IMF in providing strategic guidance to the IMF.
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The G-20 leaders expressed general support for improved administrative practices
in global economic governance. They called for reform of the mandates, the scope
and the governance of the IFIs so that they would be more reflective of changes in the
global economy and more responsive to challenges that may arise in connection with
globalisation.
Pittsburgh, September 2009
The G-20 leaders again expressed their interest in promoting participation in the key
institutions of global economic governance. They committed themselves to supporting
a shift in the IMF votes and quotas to achieve more appropriate representation of the
dynamic emerging markets and developing countries. They acknowledged that this shift
would entail some loss of votes and quotas by over-represented countries. Similarly, the
G-20 leaders called for a more equitable distribution of voting power in the World Bank.
They also promised to protect the representation of the poorest countries in the IMF
through a change in the basic votes – that is the standard allocation of 250 votes that all
members of the IMF get regardless of their IMF quota.
The G-20 members showed some concern with improving the administrative
performance of the institutions of global economic governance. They committed
themselves to pursuing governance and operational reforms that enhance the effectiveness,
relevance, and legitimacy of the World Bank.
Toronto, June 2010
The G-20 leaders paid less attention to administrative practices at this summit compared
with previous summits. Nevertheless, they repeated their interest in quota reform in the
IMF and called for this reform to be completed by the Seoul 2011 summit. They also
repeated their commitment to open, transparent, and merit-based selection processes for
the leadership of the IFIs.
Seoul, November 2010
This summit paid limited attention to administrative practices. The communiqué merely
mentions the leaders’ intention to pursue all outstanding governance reforms efforts at the
World Bank and the IMF.
Cannes, November 2011
This summit was the first to deal explicitly, in the summit communiqué, with the
management of the G-20 itself. The leaders agreed to formalise the troika process,
pursuant to which the past, current, and future chairs of the G-20 would constitute a
group to provide leadership for the work of the G-20 each year. They also agreed that
after 2015 the annual presidencies of the G-20 will be chosen from a rotation of regional
groupings. The first chair will be chosen from a G-20 Asian group consisting of China,
Indonesia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.
Los Cabos, June 2012
The summit documents do not contain any explicit references to the administrative
practices and procedures of the G-20 or the other institutional arrangements in global
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economic governance. The only exception is a reference to formalising the legal status of
the FSB.
Assessment
The issue of good administrative practices and procedures of the leading international
organisations in global economic governance, particularly the IMF and the World Bank,
appears to have been of interest to the G-20 in the early summits. However, as the political
challenges in implementing the proposed reforms became clearer and the prospects for
significant and meaningful reform receded, the G-20 seems to have paid less attention
to these issues. There are two important exceptions to this statement. The first is the
governance and legal form of the FSB. The second is the organisational practices of the
G-20 itself, with the formalisation of the troika and the regional rotation system for the
chair.
The record therefore suggests that the G-20 has demonstrated inconsistent concern
with the application of the principles of good administrative practice to the key
institutional actors in global economic governance. The administrative principle that has
received the most attention is participation. The focus of the participation reform effort
has tended to be on expanding the role of dynamic emerging markets in global economic
governance. This means that the major African beneficiary has been South Africa. As
discussed, it is the only African state that is a full member of the G-20, and it was the first
holder of the new African chair on the Executive Board of the World Bank. Besides these
changes, the administrative reforms have not resulted in, and, in fact, were not intended
to result in, greater African participation in global economic governance.
This suggests that from an African perspective it would have been useful for the
G-20 to pay attention to other elements of good administrative practice. In this regard, it
should be noted that the institutions of global economic governance comply reasonably
well with all the other elements of good administrative practice except accountability.
They are reasonably transparent, at least for state actors, and usually provide reasoned
decisions for their actions, However, most global economic governance institutions have
no formal mechanisms through which states that are not direct participants in a particular
global economic governance decision-making institution or arrangement (which includes
most African states) can hold the decision makers in that institution or arrangement
accountable. The situation is even less favourable for non-state actors. In this regard,
it is important to acknowledge the not insubstantial challenges involved in holding an
informal group of countries, like the G-20, accountable for its decisions and actions.
Factor 4: Comprehensive coverage
The focus of this factor is on assessing the extent to which the G-20, or those institutions
and actors involved in its process, addresses all the global economic concerns and interests
of all the stakeholders in global economic governance.
Although Africa has many specific concerns in global economic governance, its
overarching concern is the issue of inclusion. This means that the African states would
like to ensure that the way in which the G-20 addresses a particular issue enables African
state and non-state actors to either access the opportunities and benefits arising from
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the decisions of the G-20 or to mitigate their adverse impacts on African state and nonstate actors. Consequently, this section will focus on the G-20’s treatment of the issue of
inclusion, as it directly affects African countries.
Washington DC, November 2008
The G-20 leaders discussed inclusion in their summit documents. First, they acknowledged
that the financial crisis would have a disproportionate impact on the vulnerable in the
poorest countries and that they had a responsibility to mitigate the social impact of
the crisis. They promised to take specific actions to mitigate these impacts, including
providing $50 billion to social protection and to safeguard development in low-income
countries, and taking actions to restore developing country access to credit. Second, they
acknowledged that although most of the attention of global financial regulatory bodies
would be on matters of interest to rich countries, they must try and avoid regulatory
reforms that have adverse impacts on other countries.
It is noteworthy that although the G-20 leaders acknowledged that they need to
take account of the impact of the financial crisis on low-income countries and poor
and vulnerable communities, they made no formal effort to communicate with these
stakeholders about their efforts to deal with or their needs for managing the crisis.
London, April 2009
The focus of the London summit was on macroeconomic policy and financial regulatory
reforms that were clearly of most direct relevance to the rich countries. For example, the
focus of the financial regulatory discussions was on such topics as regulation of creditrating agencies, shadow banking and globally systemically important financial institutions.
Although these issues are all important and affect all stakeholders in the global economic
system, they are of less direct relevance to the financial and developmental challenges
facing Africa.
One important issue that the leaders addressed, that is of relevance to Africa, is that
of international standards on tax transparency. Action on this issue could mitigate the
adverse impact on African countries of such issues as transfer pricing, and capital flight.
It should also be noted that the G-20 leaders also made an effort to communicate
directly with African stakeholders about the crisis. Thus the chair of NEPAD was invited
to attend the summit, together with other non-African regional organisations and
international organisations.
Pittsburgh, September 2009
The Pittsburgh summit addressed a number of dimensions of the inclusion issue. First,
the leaders committed to work together to ensure that their fiscal, monetary, trade and
structural policies are collectively consistent with sustainable and balanced growth.
Second, they pledged to improve access to food, financing, and fuel for the poor and
to promote deployment of clean affordable energy to the developing world. Third, they
reaffirmed their commitment to the MDGs and their pledges on official development
assistance, including those made to Africa at Gleneagles.
The G-20’s efforts to communicate with Africa were enhanced during this summit by
inviting both the chair of NEPAD and the African Union to attend the summit.
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Toronto, June 2010
The Toronto summit declarations contain a number of statements relevant to the issue
of inclusion. First, the leaders acknowledged that they need to consider the impact of
their policies on low-income countries and that it is important for the G-20 to help
these countries become active participants in and beneficiaries of the global economic
system. In this regard, they specifically mention the importance of the MDGs and aid
for trade. Second, for the first time at the G-20 summit level, the leaders called for full
implementation of the L’Aquila initiative on global food security.
The G-20’s efforts to communicate with Africa continued at this summit, to which both
the chair of NEPAD and the African Union were invited.
Seoul, November 2010
At this summit, the leaders adopted a multi-year action plan on development that
incorporated a number of issues relevant to inclusion. First, the leaders promised to
strengthen global financial safety nets so that they can help countries cope with financial
volatility. Second, the leaders committed to developing regulations and undertaking
initiatives to address such issues as commodity derivative markets, fossil-fuel subsidies,
safeguarding the marine environment, and dealing with climate change. Third, they also
promised to foster job creation, and increase the potential for growth. In this regard,
they also promised to adopt policies that will improve the prospects for inclusive,
sustainable and resilient growth. Fourth, the G-20 leaders stated that they will engage
with developing countries, particularly low-income countries, as equal partners in regard
to development co-operation. They stressed that in doing so they will respect national
ownership of development policies, noting that the most important determinant of
successful development is a country’s own development policy. In order to support this
insight they promised to ensure that their actions foster strong, responsible, accountable
and transparent development partnerships between the G-20 and low-income countries.
Fifth, the leaders committed to encouraging ways to stimulate and leverage private capital
flows to developing countries and to overcoming obstacles to investment in infrastructure
in developing countries.
Sixth, they discussed the importance of transparent procurement policies in regard
to development and anti-corruption efforts. Seventh, they promised to assess how best
to integrate environmental safeguards into infrastructure development in an effective
and cost-efficient way. Eighth, they stressed the importance of social protection and
remittances and access to financial services in providing income security to poor
communities in developing countries. Ninth, they promised to help developing countries
tax MNEs through effective transfer pricing as part of their resource mobilisation efforts.
Finally, they committed to helping developing countries mitigate the risks to development,
including volatility in food markets and exclusion from financial services.
It should be noted that none of these actions is explicitly intended to benefit African
countries. Nevertheless, they are all relevant to Africa, and, if implemented, would
improve African countries’ ability to participate in and benefit from the global economy.
The G-20’s efforts to communicate with Africa continued at this summit, to which both
the chair of NEPAD and the African Union were invited.
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Cannes, November 2011
The G-20 leaders made a number of statements relevant to inclusion at this summit.
First, they noted that the financial transactions tax initiative could be used for a variety of
purposes, including development financing. Second, they agreed to a number of measures
relating to food security, an issue of great relevance to Africa. These measures include
acting within the framework of the Action Plan on Food Price Volatility and Agriculture;
launching the Agricultural Market Information System; developing risk management and
humanitarian emergency tools that can improve food security; facilitating food purchasing
by the World Food Programme (WFP); and enhancing monitoring of the implementation
of commitments made in the L’Aquila Food Security Initiative. Third, they proposed
mainstreaming development experiences through knowledge-sharing platforms and
networks. Fourth, they expressed an intention to increase efforts to develop the capacity
of different stakeholders in the value chain to attract investments that will enhance
sustainable development and job creation. Fifth, they planned to recommend actions
to overcome the obstacles to infrastructure financing and construction in low-income
countries, with a particular emphasis on sub-Saharan African countries. In this regard, they
noted the importance of an enabling environment for both public and private investment
in infrastructure, including regional infrastructure in low-income countries, including
sub-Saharan African countries. Sixth, the leaders recommended technical assistance to
strengthen capacities in African countries and regional economic communities to foster
trade – including trade facilitation, the African Union’s Minimum Integration Plan, and
the Aid for Trade for Africa Programme of the multilateral development banks (MDBs).
The G-20’s efforts to communicate with Africa continued at this summit, to which both
the chair of NEPAD and the African Union were invited.
Los Cabos, June 2012
The agenda of the Los Cabos summit was broad and covered a range of issues that have
implications for Africa. However, only certain items on the agenda directly relate to the
challenge of inclusion. First, the G-20 leaders committed to minimising the spillovers
onto other countries of policies implemented for domestic purposes. Second, they
acknowledged that they should explore the potential for green growth as a means to foster
inclusive growth, job creation and sustainable use of natural resources. The leaders noted
that green growth should contribute to poverty eradication and sustainable development.
Third, the G-20 leaders agreed to promote policies that integrate gender perspectives in
policies and programmes relating to employment and to fight discrimination. Fourth,
they suggested that more attention should be paid to helping workers transition from the
informal to the formal sector, to promoting job creation and work experience through
apprenticeships, internships, on-the-job training schemes and to such issues as labour
mobility in regard to job training, and to addressing issues such as rural–urban transition.
The G-20 labour ministers also noted the need to promote basic and secondary education.
They pointed out that conditional cash transfers can be effective poverty-alleviation
instruments. Fifth, the G-20 leaders called for efforts to promote technology transfers and
national policies dealing with food security that, inter alia, benefit small-scale farmers.
In this regard, they note the relevance of structural poverty, scarce resources, nutritional
status, gender inequality, and access to food.
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Sixth, they also agreed to support platforms for sharing knowledge on how to deal
with food security, growth with resilience, human resource development, innovative
financing, and creating an enabling environment for inclusive green growth. Seventh, the
leaders noted that there is work being done in the international standard-setting bodies
relating to financial inclusion and the funding of small and medium enterprises. In this
regard, they noted the relevance of the Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion and
the G-20 Financial Inclusion Action Plan and the work being done to create a G-20 Basic
Set of Financial Inclusion Indicators. Eighth, the G-20 committed to engage with the
private sector to better understand the constraints it faces in financing infrastructure.
Ninth, the leaders acknowledged that transfer pricing remains a challenge for developing
countries. Tenth, the development working group proposed to explore the linkages
between its different work streams with the goal of identifying synergies between them
and of developing a more holistic approach to development co-operation with particular
emphasis on food security, infrastructure and inclusive green growth.
Eleventh, the development working group reiterated the importance of incorporating
social and environmental costs and benefits into economic decision making, noting
that this is particularly relevant to inclusive green growth. Twelfth, the working group
noted the importance of improving international co-operation so that countries can
pursue inclusive green growth in a non-prescriptive, non-conditional way and in terms
of accessing financing on a voluntary basis. The group also listed factors that it thought
were central to inclusive green growth, including sustainable consumption and production
patterns; developing sustainable infrastructure including mass transit; linkages between
energy, food security and water; and incorporating the social dimensions of health,
education, human resource development, social protection, decent jobs; and incorporating
sustainability perspectives into business decision making. The development working
group stressed that these issues should be addressed with attention to country needs and
circumstances.
Assessment
It is clear that over the course of the seven G-20 summits, the amount of attention the
issue of inclusion has received has increased. Usually the increased attention has been
focused on the poor and vulnerable in general. Nevertheless, there are specific issues and
initiatives that explicitly address African concerns. Although this attention to inclusion
is to be welcomed, it is necessary to recognise that it is unclear that the increased
attention will translate into meaningful action. This caution follows from the fact that
the statements relating to inclusion usually are not linked to specific actions or timebound commitments. Consequently, the expressions of concern and the commitments
being made are difficult to monitor and they form a weak basis on which to hold G-20
states accountable.
The evolution in the G-20’s consideration of the issue of inclusion raises two possible
avenues for future action. First, the African representatives in the G-20 process can seek
to make the G-20 promises and commitments on inclusion more precise and time-bound.
Second, there is a need for more research on why the G-20’s consideration of this issue
has grown. It is not self-evident that the issue’s direct relevance to the G-20 participating
states has increased or that particular participating states or their invited international
organisational and state guests have been advocating for more attention to be paid to the
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issue of inclusion. Understanding why the G-20 is paying more attention to this issue,
therefore, may provide some insight into how South Africa, as a G-20 participant, and the
other African countries participating in the G-20 can advocate more effectively within the
G-20 and global economic governance actors more generally for more attention to this
issue.
Factor 5: Co-ordinated specialisation
Based on its documents, it is clear that the G-20 anticipates that it will play the role
of global co-ordinator in global economic governance. This means that it will seek to
promote coherence in global economic governance by co-ordinating the actions and
mandates of all the other institutional actors in international economic governance. Thus
this section focuses on how it attempts to perform this function, particularly in regard to
issues of interest to Africa.
Washington DC, November 2008
At this summit, the G-20 leaders made a number of statements regarding institutional
co-ordination. First, they called for strengthened collaboration between the World Bank
and the IMF. In this regard, they promised to support the World Bank’s efforts to support
low-income countries and to provide additional resources to the World Bank and the other
multilateral development banks. They also stated that they would increase, through gold
sales, the resources that the IMF has for low-income countries. Second, they called on the
UN and other relevant international organisations to monitor the impact of the financial
crisis on the poor and most vulnerable. Third, they called on international organisations
to help developing countries to develop regulations that are consistent with international
standards. The G-20 also asked the Financial Action Task Force to continue fighting
money laundering and terrorist financing, and the FSF and the IMF to collaborate on
providing early warning on macroeconomic and financial risk. Finally, the G-20 promised
to provide support to the Stolen Assets Recovery programme of the World Bank. This
programme is of particular relevance to Africa.
London, April 2009
At this summit, the G-20 again called for greater co-operation and co-ordination between
the IFIs in order to increase their effectiveness and for more financing for the IMF and
the MDBs. The leaders also reiterated their request to the UN and other international
organisations to monitor the impact of the crisis on the poor and most vulnerable.
Pittsburgh, September 2009
The G-20 leaders began to pay closer attention at this summit to the need to promote
co-ordination between the various actors in global economic governance. First, they
designated the G-20 as the premier forum for international economic co-operation.
Second, the leaders tasked their finance ministers to work with the IMF and the FSB,
the successor to the FSF, to develop co-operative and co-ordinated exit strategies from
the global financial crisis. Third, they asked the IMF to assist their ministers of finance
and Central Bank governors in the mutual assessment programme, the G-20 peer-review
programme developed at this summit. Fourth, they asked the World Bank to advise them
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on progress in promoting development and poverty reduction as part of global rebalancing
and to work with donors and organisations to develop a multilateral trust fund to scale
up agricultural assistance to developing countries. They also requested the World Bank
to play a leading role in dealing with problems that require globally co-ordinated actions
such as climate change and food security. Fifth, they asked the IMF to advise them and
the International Monetary and Financial Committee on global economic developments
and the risks to growth.
Sixth, the G-20 leaders asked the International Energy Agency, the Organization of the
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and IOSCO to take various actions to improve
the transparency of energy markets. Seventh, they urged the World Bank, the African
Development Bank (AfDB), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the WFP
to work with their relevant stakeholders to co-ordinate efforts to deal with food insecurity.
Eighth, they requested the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor and the International
Finance Corporation to launch, together with other interested international organisations
and stakeholders, a G-20 financial inclusion expert group. Finally, the leaders repeated
their intention to make sure the IMF and the World Bank and the MDBs had adequate
resources to meet their expanding range of activities.
Toronto, June 2010
At this summit, the G-20 leaders continued their practice of assigning specific tasks to
specific international institutional actors in global economic governance. They tasked
the FSB, in consultation with the IMF, to report to their ministers of finance and Central
Bank governors on improving supervision and regulation in the financial sector. They
promised to strengthen their commitment to the IMF’s and World Bank’s Financial Sector
Assessment Programs and pledged to provide robust support to the proposed FSB peerreview process. They also committed themselves to strengthen the credibility, legitimacy
and effectiveness of the IFIs so that they could be stronger partners of the G-20. In this
regard, they again promised to provide adequate resources to the MDBs, including the
International Development Association and the African Development Fund. In addition
to recommitting themselves to completing the Doha Round, the G-20 leaders asked the
World Bank and the other MDBs to step up their support for trade facilitation. The leaders
also agreed to establish a G-20 development working group to develop a development
agenda and multi-year action plan for the G-20.
Seoul, November 2010
The G-20 leaders, at this summit, expressed their support for a number of collaborative
efforts at either the global or regional level. First, they encouraged the work being done
by the Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion and the SME Finance Framework to
improve access to financing for small and medium-size businesses and poor people.
These initiatives will be co-ordinated with the APEC initiative on this issue. Second, the
leaders committed themselves to full and timely implementation of the aid effectiveness
agenda being negotiated at Busan and to working with international organisations like
the World Bank to tackle global and regional systemic issues where the G-20 can play a
useful catalytic role. In this regard, the G-20 leaders anticipated that there would be space
for collective and co-ordinated actions through South–South and triangular co-operation.
Third, the G-20 encouraged international organisations like the UN, World Bank, OECD,
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and the regional development banks to co-operate on knowledge sharing relating to
growth and development. Fourth, the G-20 proposed working with regional organisations
and developing countries to support initiatives like the Infrastructure Project Preparation
Facility, NEPAD, and the African Water Facility. Fifth, the G-20 delegated to the ILO,
UNDP, MDBs and relevant international organisations the task of identifying lessons that
can be learned about implementation of social protection mechanisms in developing
countries and low-income countries. Sixth, the G-20 leaders proposed that agricultural
development be supported in conjunction with the Global Agricultural and Food Security
Program and other bilateral and multilateral channels. In this regard, they also endorsed
the Rome Principles dealing with sustainable agriculture. Seventh, the ILO, World Bank,
OECD and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization were assigned
responsibility for developing comparable and practical indicators of skills for employment
and productivity in developing countries and for skills-development initiatives.
Cannes, November 2011
At this summit, the G-20 leaders, once again, encouraged a number of collaborative
efforts. First, they called for the IMF and regional financial arrangements to collaborate
in promoting financial integration, seeing this as a useful means of promoting crisis
prevention. Second, the FSB was assigned responsibility for improving the capacity to
co-ordinate and monitor the financial regulatory agenda. In this regard, the G-20 supported
the efforts to reform the FSB so as to clarify its legal status, mandate and governance.
Third, the G-20 leaders urged the WTO to work with the OECD and UNCTAD to address
the challenges of protectionism. Fourth, they welcomed the creation of a Rapid Response
Forum to improve the international community’s capacity to co-ordinate policies and
responses in times of market crises relating to food. In dealing with food security, the G-20
expressed support for the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme
(CAADP) as a vehicle to link small-scale farmers to markets. The G-20 also confirmed
their support for the WFP and urged reform of the FAO. Fifth, the G-20 called on the
UN, WTO, ILO, World Bank, IMF and the OECD to promote dialogue on the social
impact of economic policies and to intensify co-ordination in this regard. Sixth, the G-20
welcomed the initiative of the African Union and the AfDB to jointly review progress
at their annual meetings relating to their efforts to promote sustainable development
and engagements with the private sector and civil society. Seventh, the G-20, as part
of its interest in promoting domestic resource mobilisation, urged the Global Forum
on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes to offer a platform to
international organisations to co-ordinate technical assistance in this area. Eighth, the
G-20 welcomed the MDB Infrastructure Action Plan.
Los Cabos, June 2012
The G-20 encouraged a number of collaborative efforts at this summit. First, the G-20
welcomed the FSB’s work with the IMF and World Bank to identify the unintended
impacts of regulatory reform on emerging market and developing countries. Second, the
G-20 agricultural ministers expressed their support of such risk-management initiatives as
the Platform for Agricultural Risk Management, Global Index Insurance Facility, Weather
Risk Management Facility, R4 Rural Resilience Initiative, and the Weather Information
for All. They also called for continued collaboration with the UN Committee on World
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Food Security and other relevant international organisational initiatives like the Global
Agricultural and Food Security Program and the African Agricultural Fund. They
encouraged the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to
establish a pilot project for Emergency Humanitarian Food Reserves for the Sahel crisis.
They also expressed support for a number of other initiatives, including the Principles
for Responsible Agricultural Investment, and called for pilot projects to field test these
principles; the Voluntary Guidelines on Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries, and
Forests in the Context of National Food Security; and the 6th World Water Forum’s work
on water and food security. Third, the G-20 leaders reiterated their support for consulting
with international organisations with an employment and social mandate about assessing
the social impact of economic policies, as advocated by these international organisations.
They requested the ILO, OECD and other relevant international organisations to work
with national organisations to better understand the situation of young people in G-20
countries. Fourth, in order to promote more effective management of research and
development activities, the leaders urged information-sharing efforts between the FAO,
the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, Biodiversity International,
the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and Equitable Sharing Benefits
Arising for Utilization of Convention on Biodiversity, Global Rice Science Partnership and
the Coalition for African Rice Development. Fifth, the G-20 welcomed the co-ordination
platform launched by the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for
Tax Purposes that, at the request of the G-20, facilitates technical assistance to developing
countries and the pilot projects in Ghana and Kenya that are being supported by the
World Bank and the UK.
Sixth, the G-20 welcomed the initiative of the AfDB, OECD, UN and the World
Bank to develop a tool kit on inclusive green growth. Seventh, the G-20 reiterated its
determination to continue to serve as the co-ordination forum for international economic
co-operation in the development area and, in this regard, reaffirmed its commitment
to the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation established in Busan.
Eighth, the development working group stated that multilateral co-operation in regard to
infrastructure and inclusive green growth was a priority for the G-20. Ninth, the leaders
welcomed the work of the ILO, World Bank and UNCP on social protection, particularly
as it relates to low-income countries. Tenth, the leaders requested the OECD and the WTO
to continue monitoring aid-for-trade flows and took note of their work on the implications
of global value chains for trade.
Eleventh, the leaders reaffirmed their commitment to working with a range of
international organisations. They stated that they would work with the MDBs on joint
action plans on water, food and agriculture; with humanitarian agencies on a risk-hedging
strategy for humanitarian disasters; with NEPAD and other international organisations
on a fertiliser initiative; and with the MDBs on the action plan on infrastructure and
with the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa endorsed by the African
Union. In regard to the latter, the G-20 leaders stated that they looked forward to learning
the results of the review of various infrastructure-related initiatives relevant to Africa,
namely the Project Preparation Facility, the Infrastructure Consortium for Africa, the
Construction Sector Transparency Initiative and the Sokoni Africa Infrastructure Initiative.
They also expressed interest in the global infrastructure benchmark initiative. Twelfth,
they encouraged the AfDB’s efforts to enhance trade finance availability in Africa and its
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work to develop a trade finance facility. Finally, they welcomed the efforts of the African
Union and NEPAD on risk management in regard to the CAADP national and regional
investment plans.
Assessment
Over the course of the five-year history of the G-20 summits, the leaders, and the process
associated with their summits have assumed a much more active role in co-ordinating a
range of international activities. They are now assigning responsibility for specific activities
to particular international organisations or actors and are encouraging more of them to
collaborate with each other. The scope of their interests and actions has also expanded.
Whereas initially they only addressed the international organisations and entities involved
in international financial and monetary affairs, they are now dealing with organisations
involved in agriculture and food security, energy, labour, social protection, education and
job training, environment, and infrastructure project planning and financing.
A natural consequence of this expansion in the work of the G-20 is that it has
become more directly relevant to African state and non-state actors. In addition, given
the co-ordinating role that the G-20 plays in regard to the issues in which it has taken
an interest, the impact of the G-20 on the policies, procedures and programmes of the
international organisations and entities with which it interacts should be of concern to
African state and non-state actors. This in turn suggests that one indirect way in which
African actors can seek to ensure that the G-20 adequately responds to their concerns
and interests is through these international organisations and entities. In this regard, it is
useful to note that African countries are members of many of these organisations and so
can attempt to influence their interactions with the G-20.

CONCLUSION
This paper’s purpose is to evaluate how responsive the G-20 has been to the concerns and
interests of sub-Saharan Africa, based on the outputs of the G-20 summits from 2008–12.
The methodology used in the paper is to assess the outputs of the G-20 summits in terms
of a five-factor framework. The methodology is, undeniably, experimental and it is hoped
that it can be refined in light of further research and of critiques by experts.
Nevertheless, based on the above analysis, it is possible to offer five preliminary
conclusions, all of which are based on the discussions above. First, the G-20, in its
official outputs, has at least implicitly addressed aspects of each of the five factors in the
assessment framework used in this paper. Second, although the G-20 outputs contain few
explicit references to Africa, there is evidence to suggest that, at least implicitly, the G-20
has been somewhat responsive to a number of Africa’s concerns. This is particularly true
for those concerns that may also be shared by countries in other regions of the world.
Third, over time, the scope of the issues considered by the G-20 has become broader
and the issues more complex. It is not exactly clear why this is happening but it could
complicate the ability of the G-20 to address African concerns effectively. Fourth, the
G-20 statements tend to be quite general and without clear implementation schedules
attached to them. This makes them difficult for participants to operationalise and for other
stakeholders to hold the G-20 accountable for the commitments it appears to make in
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G-20 documents. Fifth, although the G-20 statements may be difficult to operationalise,
they do highlight issues and thus can be used by interested stakeholders to advocate for
action on issues of interest to them.
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